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Many scholars in the fields of organization theory and management strategy 
have argued that there is a tension between the two types of organizational 
learning activities, exploration and exploitation. They appear to be substitutes: the 
greater the skill at one, the harder it is to do the other well. It is often argued that 
the two activities compete for scarce resources when firms need different 
capabilities and management policies to promote one over the other. We present 
another explanation that attributes the phenomenon to the dynamic interactions 
among the activities, search, knowledge sharing, evaluation, and alignment within 
organizations relying on the NK Landscape framework (Kauffman 1993). Our 
results show that successful organizations tend to bifurcate into two types: those 
that always promote individual initiatives and build organizational strengths on 
individual learning and those good at aligning the individual knowledge base and 
exploiting shared knowledge. Straddling between the two types often fails. The 
intuition is that an equal mixture of individual search and organizational 
alignment slows down individual learning compared to the first organization type 
while making it difficult to update institutionalized knowledge because 
individuals' knowledge base is not so sufficiently aligned as in the second type. In 
such "straddling" organizations, once individuals get stuck with locally-best 
solutions in an uncoordinated manner, they cannot agree on how to improve the 
organizational knowledge. Straddling is especially inefficient when the operation 
is sufficiently complex (in other words, the interdependency is high) or when the 
business environment is sufficiently uncertain. 
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Abstract
Many scholars in the ¯elds of organization theory and management strategy have
argued that there is a tension between the two types of organizational learning ac-
tivities, exploration and exploitation. They appear to be substitutes: the greater the
skill at one, the harder it is to do the other well. It is often argued that the two
activities compete for scarce resources when ¯rms need di®erent capabilities and man-
agement policies to promote one over the other. We present another explanation that
attributes the phenomenon to the dynamic interactions among the activities, search,
knowledge sharing, evaluation, and alignment within organizations relying on the NK
Landscape framework (Kau®man 1993). Our results show that successful organizations
tend to bifurcate into two types: those that always promote individual initiatives and
build organizational strengths on individual learning and those good at aligning the
individual knowledge base and exploiting shared knowledge. Straddling between the
two types often fails. The intuition is that an equal mixture of individual search and
organizational alignment slows down individual learning compared to the ¯rst orga-
nization type while making it di±cult to update institutionalized knowledge because
individuals' knowledge base is not so su±ciently aligned as in the second type. In
such \straddling" organizations, once individuals get stuck with locally-best solutions
in an uncoordinated manner, they cannot agree on how to improve the organizational
knowledge. Straddling is especially ine±cient when the operation is su±ciently com-
plex (in other words, the interdependency is high) or when the business environment
is su±ciently uncertain.
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1 Introduction
I think our growth will end at only two or three times the current scale once
we undertake to increase routines. I think the biggest reason we don't see
\mega ventures" emerging in Japan is that every ¯rm starts organizing and
routinizing their processes too early. When I worked with American ¯rms
such as Microsoft or Apple, I was always surprised to see disorder in many
aspects of their operations. They wouldn't be called \¯rms" if they were
in Japan. Their processes are not very routinized, but that is exactly why
they can continue to grow. Their workplaces are full of chaos, especially
compared to their Japanese counterparts. However, creative people who can
make breakthroughs prefer working in such places. So it is with our com-
pany. We are paying the cost of disorganization and mistakes caused by
the chaos. . .But, it is impossible to have both creative workers and routine
workers in the optimal mix.
- Masayuki Makino, CEO, Works Applications, Inc.1
Tension between exploration and exploitation has been a central theme in the liter-
ature of organizational learning since March (1991). The issue is not a mere perception
held only by academics, but a real problem faced by many business executives, includ-
ing the above-quoted CEO of one of Japan's fast-growing business software companies.
Nevertheless, too few theories have been o®ered to analyze the trade-o®s that are
creating this tension at the organizational level. In this article, we develop an agent-
based model that formulates what we believe are four important steps of organizational
learning: search, knowledge sharing, evaluation, and alignment, through which orga-
nizational knowledge is updated. The model is useful for examining the origin of the
primary tension between exploration and exploitation.
We identify organizational congruency as a main driver of knowledge exploitation
rather than its result. Organizational congruency is formulated as the degree of align-
ment in knowledge base imposed on individuals. Higher congruency facilitates the
upgrading of organizational knowledge, which in turn accelerates exploitation in our
model. Key to our theory is the idea that knowledge diversity makes exploration more
e®ective even as it impedes the updating of organizational knowledge, thus creating
1?Works Applications, Inc. (A)?by Hideo Owan, Aoyama Business School case, November 2009.
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an obstacle to exploitation. Although March (1991) has already argued that e®orts to
exploit existing knowledge eventually suppress exploration by reducing the diversity
of knowledge, he does not illustrate the mechanism by which more exploration leads
to less exploitation or the reason the diversity of knowledge can discourage e®orts to
exploit it. The mechanism we illustrate in this paper goes beyond the usual argument
that exploration and exploitation compete for scarce resources (March, 1991; Roberts,
2004). Our theory suggests that the tension between exploration and exploitation
comes not necessarily from resource constraint, but rather from the substitutability
between initiatives and alignment.
Crossan, Lane, and White (1999) have expressed a view similar to ours: \This
tension (between exploration and exploitation) is seen in the feedforward and feedback
processes of learning across the individual, group, and organization levels." According
to them, feedforward is the transference of learning from individuals and groups to
the organizational levels where ideas are embedded in the form of systems, structures,
strategies, and procedures. Feedback is the way in which this embedded or institution-
alized learning a®ects individuals and groups. Note that the feedback process relates
to exploitation where developing organizational knowledge assimilates learning and ac-
tions at the individual level. Although our view is similar to that of Crossan et al.
(1999), the tension arises endogenously in our model, whereas it is assumed as one of
the four key premises in their frameworks (Crossan et al. 1999: 523).
There are two important assumptions that drive the key results in our theory. First,
we assume that updating organizational knowledge requires a certain level of consensus.
In our model, organizational knowledge is successfully updated only when a majority
of high performers agree with the proposal to change it. This means that the mere
showing of new ideas to others is not enough for implementation at the organizational
level. Many others must have a similar view of the world and see common meaning in
the idea. This means that a certain level of organizational congruency is required to
promote organizational learning.
Second, we assume that the organization's management in°uences individuals' time
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allocation between exploration (i.e. experimenting with new ideas) and exploitation
(i.e. copying organizational knowledge) at the individual level. The famous story of
3M's mandatory rule that its technical people should be able to devote 15 percent
of their time to any projects of their own choice rather than those they are o±cially
assigned to is a classic example. Management uses its authority and techniques for
control, such as process management, to a®ect the way people achieve their targets.
Furthermore, individuals engaging in exploitation do not have the option of ignoring or-
ganizational knowledge. Each kind of monitoring and incentive mechanism encourages
individuals to take in institutionalized knowledge as their own knowledge base.
One important implication of our model is non-concavity in the optimization prob-
lem. As argued, for example, by Levinthal and March (1993) and Ghemawat and
Ricart i Costa (1993) among others, ¯rms tend to end up with the \extremes" in the
presence of such non-concavities. According to our theory, successful ¯rms tend to
bifurcate into two types: those that always promote individual initiatives and build or-
ganizational strengths on individual learning and those good at aligning the individual
knowledge base and exploiting shared knowledge. Let us call the former high-initiative
organizations and the latter high-alignment organizations.
Straddling between the two types often fails. This bifurcation arises when the op-
eration is su±ciently complex (in other words, the interdependency is high enough)
or the business environment is su±ciently uncertain. The intuition is that an equal
mixture of individual search and knowledge alignment slows down learning through
individual search compared to the high-initiative organization while making it di±-
cult to update institutionalized knowledge because individuals' knowledge base is not
su±ciently aligned. In such organizations, once members get stuck with locally best
solutions at the individual level, they cannot agree on how to improve the organiza-
tional knowledge. We ¯nd that the resultant ine±ciency is especially large when tasks
are interdependent or when the environment continuously changes.
More formally, we develop a model of organizations that undertake tasks of varying
degrees of complexity. The complexity of a task is formulated as interdependency
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among tasks in determining functional performance following the NK landscape model
(Kau®man, 1993). We also introduce environmental uncertainties by allowing the
performance function to be rede¯ned randomly from time to time.
Each organization consists of several members who search independently for better
practices and also learn from the organizational knowledge. The organizational knowl-
edge evolves over time as proposals from the members of the organization to modify it
are constantly evaluated by high-performing members. Speci¯cally, in each period each
member of an organization either conducts an individual search for a better con¯gura-
tion (with probability ¸) or adopts the con¯guration from the organizational knowledge
(with probability 1¡¸). After all the agents have either conducted individual searches
or learned from the organizational knowledge, each agent proposes, with probability
p, to modify the organizational knowledge. Each proposal will be evaluated by the
members of organization whose performance at the time of evaluation is higher than
the average one in the organization. If the majority of high-performing members agree
on a proposed modi¯cation, the organizational knowledge is changed.2
The two parameters of the model, ¸ and p, represent the degree of organizational
congruency and the frequency of knowledge sharing within the organization, respec-
tively. The lower ¸ is, the higher is the degree of organizational congruency. In other
words, when ¸ is low, it is more likely that members of the organization follow practices
or procedures that embody the organizational knowledge, regardless of whether or not
adopting them results in higher performance. When p is high, every agent attempts to
change the organizational knowledge more frequently.
Through extensive simulations of the model, we ¯nd that (1) frequent knowledge
sharing within an organization has positive in°uences on its performance and (2) there
exist non-monotonic relationships between the degree of organizational congruency
and the organizational performance, especially when tasks are either complex or the
environment is uncertain. Namely, the performance of an organization is high when
there is a substantial, but not overly strong, degree of congruency (¸ ¼ 0:2) or no
2In case of a tie, a proposal is approved with probability 1/2.
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congruency at all (¸ ¼ 1:0).
It is rather intuitive that too much congruency is counter-productive, since agents
do not search for better practices and since without such individual searches it is not
possible to improve the organizational knowledge from which agents learn. However,
more detailed analyses may be required in order to understand the non-monotonisity
of the relationship between congruency and performance. Our analyses reveal that the
performance of an organization with no congruency (i.e. ¸ = 1:0) is always better than
that of any other organization in early periods. When the task is su±ciently complex,
however, on average, the performance of an organization with a substantial degree of
congruency and frequent knowledge sharing catches up with and exceeds that of the
former organization in later periods. This reversal of performance comes from the
di®erence in the rate at which the organizational knowledge improves. When a task
is complex, each member of an organization may arrive at distinct but locally best
practices and may fail to agree on how to change the organizational knowledge. As
long as agents rarely follow the organizational knowledge, this is not a problem (just
as in the case of an organization without congruency). However, an organization with
a moderate degree of congruency su®ers from such disagreements because they result
in its agents adopting practices that are not proven to generate high value.
The same phenomenon arises when environmental uncertainty is high. In such an
environment, an organization needs to keep up with the changing environment by con-
tinuously modifying the organizational knowledge. However, when agents are equally
likely to be conducting individual searches and adopting practices from the organiza-
tional knowledge, they fail to agree on how to adjust the organizational knowledge and,
as a consequence, organizational performance su®ers.
When congruency is high but not overly strong (¸ ¼ 0:2), such disagreements about
how to modify the organizational knowledge do not arise as frequently. Most members
of the organization share the same ideas and search in similar directions. Hence, orga-
nizational knowledge will improve continuously as long as there is su±cient knowledge
sharing within the organization. And, the performance of such organizations eventually
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exceeds that of organizations with a low or an intermediate level of congruency.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: in Section 2 we present the model
studied in this paper, in Section 3 we present and discuss the results of simulation, and
in Section 4 we conclude the discussion.
2 Model
Consider an organization that consists of M agents. Each agent undertakes an
identical task having N dimensions. The value that an agent generates depends on how
the agent con¯gures each dimension of the task. The performance of the organization
depends on the values generated by the agents therein.
Let xij(t) 2 f0; 1g be agent i's con¯guration of dimension j in period t,3 and X i(t) 2
f0; 1gN = fxi1(t); xi2(t); :::; xiN (t)g be i's con¯guration of the task in period t. The
corresponding value agent i generates, or the performance of agent i in period t, is
¦i(t) = ¼(X i(t)). The performance of the organization, ¦(t), is de¯ned simply as the
mean performance of its members, i.e., ¦(t) = 1M
P
i¦
i(t):
We formulate the performance function ¼(¢) based on the NK Landscape model
(Kau®man, 1993), which allows us to parameterize the interdependencies among N
dimensions with a parameter K. Namely, the ideal con¯guration for dimension j
depends on i's con¯gurations of K other dimensions.4 Let ¡j = fl1; l2; :::; lKg be
the set of these K dimensions that a®ect the e®ectiveness of xij(t), and X
i
j(t) =
fxil1(t); xil2(t); :::; xilK (t)g 2 f0; 1gK be i's con¯gurations of these K dimensions in pe-
riod t. Then,
¼(Xi(t)) =
1
N
NX
j=1
qj(xij(t); X
i
j(t))
3The assumption that each dimension can be either zero or one is made for the sake of simplicity. One
can easily extend the model so that a dimension can be con¯gured in many ways. If the number of possible
con¯gurations of a dimension is c, then the number of possible con¯gurations of the task becomes cN :
4We assume that these K dimensions are chosen randomly from N ¡ 1 other dimensions. One can also
consider many other possible structures of interdependencies. Rivkin and Siggelkow (2007) demonstrate that
the structure of interdependencies, even controlling for K, a®ects the complexity of the environment and the
e®ectiveness of various search strategies.
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where qj(xj ; Xj) is de¯ned by assigning values drawn randomly from U [0; 1] to each
possible xj and Xj . Every agent faces the same performance function ¼(¢) or fqjg.
When modeled in this way, the number of possible con¯gurations of the task is
2N , a potentially large space in which agents must search for better con¯gurations.
The parameter K captures the complexity of the task. When K = 0, there is no
interdependency among dimensions; thus, changing the con¯guration of one dimension
results in smooth changes in performance. The larger K is, the more interdependencies
there are among di®erent dimensions. When K is large, changing the con¯guration of
one dimension has a non-additive e®ect on the value generated by the agent.
To capture the uncertainty of the environment in which organizations operate,
we introduce a parameter ¹ 2 [0; 1] such that, in each period and for each possible
con¯guration of the task X, qj(xj ; Xj) is rede¯ned randomly to a value drawn from
U [0; 1] with probability ¹. When ¹ is zero, the values associated with each possible
con¯guration of the task remain constant over time. When the value of ¹ is higher,
these values can change quite drastically from period to period.
The NK landscape has been applied in the literature on organization theory. In their
series of papers, Rivkin and Siggelkow have considered how to design a decision-making
process in hierarchical (or multi-level) organizations undertaking complex projects in
uncertain environments (Rivkin and Siggelkow, 2003, 2007; Siggelkow and Rivkin, 2005,
2006). In particular, one of their foci has been to understand the relationship between
the levels of decision making when lower layers of hierarchy have narrower scope. Other
applications of NK landscape in management literature include, for example, Gavetti
and Levinthal (2000). Gavetti and Levinthal (2000) consider the interplays between
a forward-looking \o®-line" search and a backward-looking \on-line" search and their
implications to organizational performance. Our analysis departs from the existing
literature in the following two respects: (1) we do not consider hierarchical organi-
zation, and (2) the focus of our analysis is on organizational congruency, which has
not been considered formally in the literature. We now turn to how the behaviors of
organizations are modeled.
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2.1 Search, learning, and organizational congruency
We assume that each agent receives a randomly con¯gured task initially; i.e.,
xij(0) 2 f0; 1g are randomly set for all i and j. Agents modify their con¯gurations
over time by conducting individual searches and by learning from the organizational
knowledge. Let ­(t) = fo1(t); o2(t); :::; oN (t)g where oj(t) 2 f0; 1g represents the orga-
nizational knowledge at period t. We assume that ­(0) is randomly set. We allow the
organizational knowledge itself to evolve over time as agents in the organization con-
tribute their knowledge in the manner described below. Note that knowledge sharing
improves organizational performance because agents face the same fqjg.
In each period, each agent either conducts an individual search for a better con¯g-
uration (with probability ¸) or learns from the organizational knowledge (with proba-
bility 1 ¡ ¸). The individual searches are conducted as follows: an agent chooses one
of the N dimensions randomly and ascertains whether changing its con¯guration gen-
erates a greater value. If it does, he adopts the change. Otherwise, his con¯guration
remains as before.
When an agent learns from the organizational knowledge, he randomly chooses a
dimension such that his current con¯guration di®ers from that of the organizational
knowledge and adopts the organizational knowledge for the chosen dimension. Copying
a part of the organizational knowledge in this manner gradually assimilates the individ-
ual knowledge base to the organizational knowledge if ¸ is su±ciently low. We call this
process alignment because the assimilated knowledge base facilitates upgrading of the
organizational knowledge as explained later. When adopting the con¯guration from
the organizational knowledge, the agent does not check whether doing so generates a
higher value. We assume that the organization's management institutes a monitoring
and incentive mechanism to enforce the alignment of the organizational base.
On the one hand, when ¸ is low, agents tend to follow the con¯gurations of the
organizational knowledge; thus, their practices are all aligned with each other. When ¸
is high, on the other hand, since agents pursue individual searches, their con¯gurations
may remain diverse. Therefore, we can interpret the parameter ¸ to represent the level
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of organizational congruency (i.e., high ¸ indicates low organizational congruency).
It is of our interest to discover the relationship between the degree of organizational
congruency represented by ¸ and organizational performance under various levels of
complexity and uncertainty.
At the end of each period, with probability p, each agent proposes to modify the
organizational knowledge. When an agent proposes to modify the organizational knowl-
edge, he randomly chooses one dimension such that his con¯guration di®ers from that
of organizational knowledge. And, he proposes to change the con¯guration of the cho-
sen dimension in the organizational knowledge so that it will be the same as his current
con¯guration. Whether the proposal is accepted or not depends on voting by agents in
the organization. It is accepted if the majority of the agents whose performance is no
less than the performance of the organization5 con¯gure the dimension as proposed.6
The parameter p can be interpreted as the frequency of knowledge sharing within the
organization. The higher the value of p is, the more quickly organizational knowledge
improves.
The model presented here is similar to that of March (1991), which studies the rela-
tionship between exploitation of existing knowledge and exploration of new knowledge
in an abstract model. In particular, both our model and that of March (1991) consider
interactions between individual search and learning within an organization through
communications among its members. Our model di®ers, however, from that of March
(1991) in its assumption of the underlying con¯guration space. While the latter as-
sumes the existence of a unique con¯guration that an organization needs to discover,
our model employs the NK landscape so that there can be many distinct locally-best
con¯gurations when a task is complex. We are not aware of existing research that
formally attempts to understand the e®ect of organizational congruency in the face of
such multiplicities of locally-best con¯gurations.
5That is, we consider the majority of those agent k such that ¦k(t) ¸ ¦(t).
6In the case of a tie, a proposal is approved with probability 1=2.
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1. Set parameter values, and give a random seed
2. Initialize NK landscape, agents, and organizational knowledge
3. for 1 · t · 1000
(a) for each agent 1 · i · M
(i) Search (¸) or Copy (1¡ ¸)
(ii) update the agent's con¯guration and performance
(b) Update performance of organization
(c) for each agent 1 · i · M (in random orders)
(i) Propose (with prob. p) or not.
(ii) If proposes, evaluate the proposal
(iii) update organizational knowledge
(c) if ¹ > 0, update NK landscape, the performances of agents and the organization
(d) Back to (a)
Table 1: Pseudo Code
3 Results
There are six parameters in our model. The task is de¯ned by its size N and its
complexity K. The environmental uncertainty is captured by ¹. The organization is
characterized by the number of agents, M , the frequency of knowledge sharing among
them, p, and the level of organizational congruency, ¸. In all the simulations, we ¯x
N and M to be 100 and 20, respectively, and vary other parameters to investigate the
e®ect of congruency and communications on the performance of organizations under
various degrees of complexity and uncertainty.7
For each set of parameter values, the payo® function, ¼(¢), initial con¯guration for
individual task X i(0), and organizational knowledge, ­(0), are generated. Then, we
allow organizations to operate in the manner described in the Model section for 1000
periods. Table 1 shows the pseudo code of the simulations.
To summarize the performance of an organization over time, we mainly focus on
present discounted values (PDVs) of organizational performance over these 1000 pe-
riods: namely, ¦ =
P1000
t=1 ±
t¦(t) where ± is a discount factor. Below, we will set the
discount factor to be ± = 0:999.8 This discount factor gives the payo® for the last
7The appendix shows the results fromM = 10 andM = 30, which are similar to the results fromM = 20.
8If we set the discount factor too low, the payo® at t = 1000 will be given a negligible weight compared
to those for earlier periods. For example, if ± = 0:95, the weight for the payo® at t = 1000 will be less than
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Figure 1: Average PDVs of organizational performances for various p and ¸ in four combina-
tions of complexities (K = 0 (left) and K = 8 (right)) and uncertainties (¹ = 0:0 (top) and
¹ = 0:005 (bottom)). Discount factor is ± = 0:999. Data are generated by taking average
over 100 simulation runs for each set of parameter values.
period a weight that is 0.37 of that for the ¯rst period. We also take the average over
100 simulation runs based on varying random seeds.
3.1 E®ect of p and ¸
Figure 1 shows the PDV (shown by height) for various degrees of activeness of
communication p (the horizontal axis) and of control ¸ (the vertical axis) under four
combinations of complexities, K 2 f0; 8g, and uncertainties, ¹ 2 f0:0; 0:005g. Recall
that a higher ¸ represents weaker organizational control (or congruency).
0:01% of the payo® at the period t = 1. Since it is possible for performance to take a long time to level o®,
we would like the payo® at t = 1000 to have enough weight compared to the initial payo®s.
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In all four panels in Figure 1, one can see that organizational performance measured
by PDV becomes higher as we move along the horizontal axis from left to right. That
is, the more frequently individuals engage in knowledge sharing, the higher their orga-
nizational performance, regardless of task complexity and environmental uncertainty.
While the ¯gure exhibits a monotonic relationship between PDV and frequency
of knowledge sharing, p, the relationship between PDV and level of organizational
congruency, ¸, is not monotonic in three out of four cases shown in Figure 1. Except
for cases in which the task is simple and there is no environmental uncertainty (Panel
(A)) or the level of knowledge sharing in the organization is very low (low p), the
performance of the organization has two peaks: (1) when organizational congruency is
very low, i.e, ¸ ¼ 1:0; and when there is a substantial, but not overly strong, degree of
congruency, ¸ ¼ 0:2. We call the former, a high-initiative organization and the latter
a high-alignment organization. When ¸ is very small (so that individual searches
are seldom conducted) or has intermediate values of around 0.5 or 0.6, performance
becomes low.
The non-monotonic relationship between ¸ and organizational performance can be
better seen in Figure 2. For the same four combinations of K and ¹ as in Figure 1,
Figure 2 plots PDVs against various values of ¸ for three values of p: p = 0:0 (solid
black), p = 0:5 (solid gray), and p = 1:0 (dashed black). One can see from the ¯gure
that for ¸ ¼ 0:2 to generate as high a level of performance as ¸ ¼ 1:0, the e®orts to
share knowledge must be persistent (i.e., high p). Another point indicated by Figure 2 is
that in the case of complex tasks (K = 8), organizational performance declines sharply
as one moves away from the state of full individual search, i.e., ¸ = 1:0, while there
is a wider range of ¸ with values around ¸ = 0:2 that maintains high performance.
This suggests that when knowledge sharing activities are su±cient, any shift from
full exploration (i.e., ¸ = 1:0) may require a substantial leap toward a state of high
congruency.9
9Figure 2 also shows that when the task is simple (K = 0), the introduction of a small degree of congruency
can improve performance compared to the case of no congruency.
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(A) K = 0 and ¹ = 0:0 (B) K = 8 and ¹ = 0:0
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Figure 2: Average PDVs of organizational performances for various ¸ in four combinations
of complexities (K = 0 (left) and K = 8 (right)) and uncertainties (¹ = 0:0 (top) and
¹ = 0:005 (bottom)). In each ¯gure, results for three distinct ps are reported: p = 0:0 (solid
black), p = 0:5 (solid gray), and p = 1:0 (dashed black). Discount factor is ± = 0:999. Data
are generated by taking average over 100 simulation runs.
Why do successful organizations, in the face of complex tasks and uncertain en-
vironments, bifurcate into two types: high-initiative (¸ = 1:0) vs. high-alignment
(¸ ¼ 0:2)? In other words, why do we obtain non-monotonic relationships between
¸ and organizational performance? To answer this question, we turn to dynamics of
performance over time.
3.2 Dynamics
Figure 3 shows the dynamics of organizational performance for four values of ¸,
¸ 2 f0:0; 0:2; 0:6; 1:0g (shown in solid black, solid gray, dashed black and dashed gray,
respectively), for the four combinations of K 2 f0; 8g and ¹ 2 f0:0; 0:005g considered
in Figures 1 and 2. These four ¸s are chosen because they correspond approximately
to the local maxima and minima of organizational performance measured by PDV.
Knowledge sharing within an organization is assumed to be very frequent, p = 1:0,
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(A) K = 0 and ¹ = 0:0 (B) K = 8 and ¹ = 0:0
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(C) K = 0 and ¹ = 0:005 (D) K = 8 and ¹ = 0:005
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Figure 3: Average performance over time for two levels of complexity, K = 0 (left) and
K = 8 (right), and two degrees of environmental uncertainty, ¹ = 0:0 (top) and ¹ = 0:005
(bottom). Four values of ¸ are considered: ¸ = 0:0 (solid black) ,¸ = 0:2 (solid gray), ¸ = 0:6
(dashed black), ¸ = 1:0 (dashed gray). The communication is active (p = 1:0). The data
is generated by taking the average per period organizational performance for each block of
100 periods. The average from 100 simulation runs is reported.
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which corresponds to the dashed black curves in Figure 2.10 Figure 3 reports the
average per-period organizational performance for each block of 100 periods, i.e., for
t 2 [1; 100], t 2 [101; 200] and so on.
When the task is simple and there is no environmental uncertainty, organizations
with lower degrees of congruency (i.e., higher ¸s) demonstrate faster improvements in
performance (Panel (A)). WhenK = 0, the best con¯guration for the task can be found
through a local search procedure, such as the individual searches considered in this
paper. Therefore, all the agents in an organization will eventually ¯nd the unique best
con¯guration as long as ¸ > 0:0. (Note that when ¸ = 0:0, there is no individual search,
so that agents never ¯nd the best con¯guration). Once everyone in an organization
has found the best con¯guration, there is no further improvement in organizational
performance. When all the agents in an organization only conduct individual searches
and do not copy from organizational knowledge (i.e, ¸ = 1:0), each agent rapidly ¯nds
the best con¯guration. Organizations that employ full individual search (¸ = 1:0)
are not especially superior to organizations with higher levels of congruency (¸ < 1:0)
because organizations can achieve very good performance provided knowledge sharing
takes place frequently enough and organizational knowledge is improved rapidly. As
knowledge sharing becomes less frequent (i.e., lower p), however, higher congruency
imposed on individuals (i.e, lower ¸) would instead disturb individual searches and
retard organizational performance.
When the task is complex, the results are quite di®erent, even in the complete
absence of environmental uncertainty. Panel (B) of the ¯gure shows that a higher
value of ¸ corresponds to a higher performance only at early periods, namely the ¯rst
100 periods. In later periods, for example for t 2 [101; 200], while ¸ = 1:0 (dashed gray)
exhibits the highest performance, the performance of ¸ = 0:6 (dashed black) is lower
than that of ¸ = 0:2 (solid gray). Eventually, the performance of ¸ = 0:2 exceeds that
of ¸ = 1:0. This case demonstrates the possible trade-o® between the performances in
10As we have seen above, a lower value of p results in lower performance for an organization with ¸ smaller
than one.
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earlier periods and those in later periods.11 It should also be noted that the average
performance in all three cases except for ¸ = 0:0 converge to the same level in the ¯nal
100 periods as shown in the Panel (B) of the ¯gure.
In the presence of uncertainty (Panels (C) and (D)), the performance of the orga-
nizations with ¸ = 0:2 and ¸ = 1:0 exhibit a similar pattern, as seen in the case shown
in Panel (B). Namely, initially, the organization with ¸ = 1:0 demonstrates higher
performance than the one with ¸ = 0:2, but in the later periods the performance of the
latter exceeds that of the former. The dynamics of the performance for ¸ = 0:6 (solid
black) is quite di®erent in the face of environmental uncertainty than in its absence.
That is, when there is su±cient uncertainty, performance does not improve much over
time (in the case of a complex task, Panel (D)) or can even deteriorate (in the case of
a simple task, Panel (C)). Note that due to the environmental uncertainty organiza-
tional performance in an individual simulation run demonstrates ups and downs over
time. Such volatilities are hidden, however, in Figure 3, where we plot the averaged
performance in each block of 100 periods and further take averages across 100 simula-
tion runs. Nonetheless, deterioration of average performance appears for ¸ = 0:6 after
period 200. This puzzling outcome deserves more careful analyses.
Why does the reversal of relative performance between ¸ = 0:2 and ¸ = 1:0 take
place during the course of organizational learning? And, why does performance for
¸ = 0:6 in an uncertain environment with a complex task deteriorate after an initial
improvement?
Looking at the dynamics of diversity of individual con¯gurations and the dynamics
of the value of organizational knowledge, ¼(O(t)), helps us to answer these questions.
The former is plotted in Figure 4 and the latter in Figure 5.
The diversity of the individual con¯gurations, D(t), is measured by the average
distance between individual con¯gurations and their means. The mean con¯guration of
dimension j at period t is ¹xj(t) =
P
i x
i
j(t)=M . The distance between con¯gurations of
11Therefore, if we set the discount factor ± too low, we pick up only performance in earlier periods and
fail to capture this trade-o®.
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(A) K = 0 and ¹ = 0:0 (B) K = 8 and ¹ = 0:0
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(C) K = 0 and ¹ = 0:005 (D) K = 8 and ¹ = 0:005
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Figure 4: The diversity within an organization for two levels of complexity, K = 0 (left) and
K = 8 (right), and two degrees of environmental uncertainty, ¹ = 0:0 (top) and ¹ = 0:005
(bottom). The communication is active (p = 1:0). Four values of ¸ are considered: ¸ = 0:0
(solid black), ¸ = 0:2 (solid gray), ¸ = 0:6 (dashed black), ¸ = 1:0 (dashed gray). For the
clarity of exposition, only ¸ 2 f0:0; 0:2; 0:6g are shown in the main ¯gure. See the insets
for all the four ¸s. The extent of diversity is measured based on the discrepancy between
individual con¯gurations and their means. The data is generated by taking the average per
period diversity for each block of 100 periods. The average from 100 simulation runs is
reported.
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(A) K = 0 and ¹ = 0:0 (B) K = 8 and ¹ = 0:0
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(C) K = 0 and ¹ = 0:005 (D) K = 8 and ¹ = 0:005
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Figure 5: The dynamics of the average value of organizational knowledge for two levels of
complexity, K = 0 (left) and K = 8 (right), and two degrees of environmental uncertainty,
¹ = 0:0 (top) and ¹ = 0:005 (bottom). Four values of ¸ are considered: ¸ = 0:0 (solid black)
,¸ = 0:2 (solid gray), ¸ = 0:6 (dashed black), ¸ = 1:0 (dashed gray). The communication
is active (p = 1:0). The data is generated by taking the average per period value of organi-
zational knowledge for each block of 100 periods. The average from 100 simulation runs is
reported.
individual i and the mean con¯gurations at period t is therefore Di(t) =
PN
j=1 jxij(t)¡
¹xj(t)j=N . The diversity for an organization in period t is D(t) =
PM
i=1D
i(t).
As in the case of organizational performance shown in Figure 3, we took the average
over each block of 100 periods.12 The results for four combinations of complexities
K 2 f0; 8g and uncertainties ¹ 2 f0:0; 0:005g are plotted. Four values of ¸, ¸ 2
f0:0; 0:2; 0:6; 1:0g (shown in solid black, solid gray, dashed black, and dashed gray,
respectively) are shown. p = 1:0 is assumed.
When the task is simple and there is no environmental uncertainty, the diversity
measure converges to zero for all types of organizations plotted in Figure 4 (Panel (A)).
The lower ¸ is, the faster is convergence. The reason even an organization with ¸ = 1:0
(dashed gray, shown only in the in-sets) demonstrates zero diversity in the later period
12Figure 3 reports the results obtained from taking the average of these averaged per-period diversities
across 100 simulations.
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is that, as discussed above, when K = 0 and ¹ = 0:0, every agent in the organization
eventually ¯nds the unique best con¯guration through individual searches unless ¸ is
zero. And, since everyone eventually agrees on the best con¯guration, organizational
knowledge will also be con¯gured accordingly. Therefore, the value of organizational
knowledge shows rapid improvement, as shown in Figure 5 (Panel (A)). When ¸ = 0:0
(shown in solid black), this is not the case. Although the diversity measure goes to
zero as well, the value of organizational knowledge shows little improvement. Diver-
sity disappears because everyone adopts con¯gurations from the same organizational
knowledge. However, because agents never search for better con¯gurations, they do
not have new information necessary to improve organizational knowledge.
When there is no uncertainty but the task is complex (K = 8, ¹ = 0:0), as shown
in Figure 4 (Panel (B)), diversity remains high for organizations with ¸ = 1:0 (dashed
gray, shown only in in-set) for long periods of time, while the diversity measures in
the organizations with ¸ = 0:0 and ¸ = 0:2 quickly converge to zero. In the case of
¸ = 0:6, the diversity measure declines much more slowly than in the cases of smaller
values of ¸.
The high diversity for organizations with ¸ = 1:0 under the complex task is due to
the existence of many distinct but locally-best con¯gurations. And, since such locally-
best con¯gurations vary from one another, diversity among the individual con¯gura-
tions remains high and agents in the organizations do not agree on how to improve
organizational knowledge. As a result of the inability to aggregate information and
choose the best among many local optima, the value of organizational knowledge re-
mains low (Figure 5, Panel (B)). Although the value of organizational knowledge for
the ¸ = 0:0 organization also shows little improvement, this is due to the complete
absence of individual searches.
Panel (B) of Figure 5 also shows that an organization with ¸ = 0:6 is much slower
in improving organizational knowledge than one with ¸ = 0:2. Recall that, in our
model, in order to modify organizational knowledge, not only must new proposals be
submitted, they must also be approved. In the model considered here, a proposal
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is approved when a majority of better-performing agents con¯gure the dimension as
proposed. Also, as discussed above for the case of ¸ = 1:0, when a task is complex,
individual searches may lead to various distinct con¯gurations that are local optima.
If many agents search in di®erent directions, it is more di±cult for them to agree on
how to modify organizational knowledge. The insu±cient alignment of the individual
knowledge base resulting from lower congruency creates a bottleneck to improvement of
organizational knowledge, which in turn slows down the improvement of organizational
performance.
The inability to improve organizational knowledge can be detrimental when the en-
vironment is changing. In such an unstable environment, the quality of organizational
knowledge itself can deteriorate over time, as one can see from Panel (C) of Figure 5.
Note that an organization with ¸ = 1:0 is not capable of improving organizational
knowledge when the task is complex, but it does not su®er from the bad organizational
knowledge because agents never adopt bad con¯gurations of the organizational knowl-
edge. However, when ¸ = 0:6, an intermediate level, agents can still have su±ciently
di®erent knowledge con¯gurations, which in turn hinders organizational knowledge
from improving, as shown in Panel (C) of Figure 5. This explains why the average
performance in organizations with ¸ = 0:6 deteriorates, as can be seen in Panel (C) of
Figure 3.
3.3 Optimal degree of congruency
So far we have considered four combinations of complexities of task (K 2 f0; 8g)
and uncertainties of environment (¹ 2 f0:0; 0:005g). We have seen that when the
environment is uncertain or the task is complex, successful organizations bifurcate into
two types: high-initiative vs. high-alignment organizations. We have also noted that
for the latter to be successful, very frequent knowledge sharing within the organization
is required to improve and maintain the quality of organizational knowledge. We
would also like to ¯nd out the conditions under which a high-alignment organization
outperforms a high-initiative one. Figure 6 illustrates which of the organizations with
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(A) ¸ 2 f0:2; 0:6; 1:0g or those with (B) ¸ 2 f0:2; 0:6; 0:95g performs best under various
levels of complexity of the task (K) and various degrees of environmental uncertainty
(¹). We assume very frequent knowledge sharing p = 1:0. We introduce ¸ = 0:95
instead of ¸ = 1:0 in Panel (B) of the ¯gure to test robustness of the results from
the comparison. As we have seen above, in the face of complex tasks, organizational
performance declines very sharply as one moves away from ¸ = 1:0, while there exists
a wider range of ¸ around 0.2 that generates high performance.
In Panel (A) of the ¯gure, the white (black) cells in the ¯gure show the combinations
of K and ¹ where an organization with ¸ = 1:0 (¸ = 0:2) performs the best. For Panel
(B), the white cells represent the combinations where ¸ = 0:95 performs the best.13
The gray cells without the indication \ND" show the cases where ¸ = 1:0 (or ¸ = 0:95
in the case of Panel (B)) and ¸ = 0:2 perform equally well and are both better than
¸ = 0:6. The gray cells with the indication \ND" are the region where all three ¸
perform equally well.
One can see from Panel (A) that when uncertainty is low (¹ < 0:001), a high-
initiative organization (¸ = 1:0) exhibits superior performance even when the task is
quite complex.14 The advantage of a high-initiative organization disappears once a
slight degree of alignment is introduced (Panel (B)), unless the task is simple. Overall,
our results are not robust for ¹ < 0:005. In other words, there is not much signi¯-
cant di®erence between high-initiative and high-alignment organizations in a relatively
stable environment.
As the environment becomes more uncertain but not overly so (¹ = 0:005 or 0:01),
a high-alignment organization (¸ = 0:2) demonstrates its advantage assuming that
the task is reasonably complex. When the environment becomes extremely unstable
13We have performed two-sample t-test based on PDVs generated by 100 simulations for each set of
parameter values. Depending on the results of a variance comparison test, unequal variance or equal variance
is assumed in performing t-test. One organization is said to outperform the other if the mean PDV is
signi¯cantly greater at 5% signi¯cance level in a one-tailed test.
14Note that we are measuring performance with PDVs that put higher weights on earlier periods than
later ones. As seen in the previous section, if we compare the average performance in later periods (or place
more weight on the performance of later periods by using a higher discounting factor ±), in cases of very
frequent knowledge sharing, ¸ = 0:2 is better than ¸ = 1:0.
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Figure 6: Comparison of PDV of (A) ¸ 2 f0:2; 0:6; 1:0g and (B) ¸ 2 f0:2; 0:6; 0:95g for
various degree of complexity K and uncertainty ¹. p = 1:0 and discount factor is 0:999
in calculating PDVs. White and black areas indicate ¸ = 1:0 (¸ = 0:95 in panel B) and
¸ = 0:2 demonstrate the highest performance, respectively. Gray areas indicate no di®erence
between ¸ = 1:0 (¸ = 0:95 in panel B) and ¸ = 0:2, and both are better than ¸ = 0:6. Gray
areas with \ND" indicate that all three ¸s perform equally well.
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(¹ = 0:05), though, a high-alignment organization loses its relative advantage and a
high-initiative organization tends to perform better.
This exercise reveals that institutionalizing knowledge in the form of routines, pro-
cedures, strategies, and systems generally creates advantage when the business is rea-
sonably complex and uncertain. The cost of institutionalizing knowledge is the delay
caused by the aggregation of individual knowledge. Furthermore, the assimilation of the
individual knowledge base could also hinder the improvement of organizational knowl-
edge by reducing the range of individual searches when the environment changes dras-
tically. Potential costs discussed above make it suboptimal to choose a high-alignment
organization in an extremely unstable environment.
4 Conclusion
This work demonstrates the origin of the primary tension between exploration and
exploitation and conditions in which choosing an \extreme" type of organizational
learning is optimal. We identify important roles played by organizational congruency
in facilitaing organizational learning. Our results show non-concavity in the optimiza-
tion problem of organization design and imply that two types of organization with
distinct natures could emerge. A high-initiative organization promotes individual ini-
tiatives to experiment with new ideas and build its strength on individual learning. A
high-alignment organization, in contrast, assimilates the individual knowledge base and
accelerates organizational learning through frequent knowledge sharing among individ-
uals. An organization with a more equal mix of individual initiatives and knowledge
alignment tends to perform worse, and especially so when the operation is reasonably
complex (in other words, interdependency is high enough) and/or the business envi-
ronment is reasonably uncertain. Although a high-alignment organization tends to be
favored in a moderately uncertain environment, a high-initiative organization tends to
be favored when the environment becomes extremely unstable.
There are two remaining issues to be considered. First, how robust are the results
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we have illustrated in this paper to changes in the assumptions? Speci¯c rules and
processes of updating organizational knowledge in our model must be relaxed to ex-
amine whether our bifurcation results continue to hold under di®erent assumptions.
Second, we did not consider the possibility that the degree of organizational congru-
ency changes as time goes by. Such a question is especially formidable if parameter
values, such as complexity of operation K, were to change in the course of a ¯rm's
growth. We believe that these questions can be successfully addressed by extending
the basic framework we employed in this paper, but will leave them to future research.
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A Results from M = 10 and M = 30
The main text concentrated on discussion of the results for M = 20. This appendix
presents the simulation results from M = 10 and M = 30, which are qualitatively the
same as the results in the main text. Figure 7 shows, in the same format as in Figure 1,
PDV with discount factor ± = 0:999 for various values of p and ¸ for four combinations
of K and ¹. M = 10 is on the top row and M = 30 is on the bottom row. As one
can see from comparing Figure 7 and Figure 1, the main results do not change as we
change the number of agents in the organization. What does change is the range of
values of ¸ < 1:0 that maximizes performance.
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Figure 7: Present Discounted Values of organizational performance for M = 10 (top) and
M = 30 (bottom) for four combinations of K 2 f0; 8g and ¹ 2 f0:0; 0:005g
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